The heparin safety crisis sends a strong signal that urgent changes in regulatory and manufacturing oversight are needed to ensure the safety of the global drug supply.
D
uring the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, coal miners carried caged canaries with them into the mines to serve as early biological warning systems for carbon monoxide and methane in mine air supplies. Canaries were chosen over mice because of their greater sensitivity to these gases, and because they were observed to stop singing and sway noticeably in the presence of even relatively low concentrations of the gases. This remarkable early use of biomarkers has been immortalized in the English vernacular by the phrase "…like a canary in a coal mine."
As we have learned from several recent cases of compromised drug safety, our current approach to post-marketing surveillance often bears an uncanny resemblance to nineteenth-century mine safety. Unfortunately, it is often patients who function as the canaries in our drug safety coal mines. In the most recent crisis, as many as 81 people have died-with hundreds more around the world suffering anaphylactic reactions-after receiving intravenous infusions of contaminated batches of heparin, a biologic anticoagulant purified from porcine intestines that is widely used to treat patients undergoing medical procedures such as hemodialysis.
What does the heparin incident tell us about loopholes in the current regulatory mechanisms of post-marketing drug oversight? And how might changes in the drug manufacturing landscape over the next few years affect the industry, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and other regulatory agencies around the world?
Who was to blame?
It would be easy, as has been done by many in the lay press as well as by some in the US Congress, to simply blame the heparin crisis on the failure of FDA to inspect the Chinese manufacturer that appears to have contaminated the heparin drug supply and/or on Deerfield, Illinois-based Baxter International (the principal manufacturer of heparin) for failing to detect the problem through increased analytical testing of the final heparin drug substance. But such simple finger-pointing grossly underestimates the complex challenges facing our drug safety system and, thereby, obscures the changes that are urgently needed to fix this system. And it fails to acknowledge the difficulty of detecting a contaminant for which no regulatory test was available; indeed, there are many more reasons to laud the US regulator for the nimbleness with which it responded to the crisis, once the extent of the problem became clear.
The response involved the rapid mobilization of government regulators, including FDA and the US Centers for Disease Control (Atlanta), manufacturers, such as Baxter, and several groups of academic and company investigators into a collaboration designed to (i) protect patients in the short term, (ii) determine the cause of the problem and (iii) develop assays that could be used to screen heparin to prevent a future recurrence of the problem. A Chinese supplier of the heparin active ingredient, Scientific Protein Laboratories in Changzhou, was identified as the source of the contaminant and, in February, Baxter withdrew all lots of heparin from the market, thereby effectively preventing additional cases of heparin-induced anaphylaxis.
The research collaboration then proceeded to use a combination of sophisticated analytical techniques, including multi-dimensional nuclear magnetic resonance in concert with enzymatic digestion, to identify oversulfated chondroitin sulfate-a synthetically altered from of chondroitin sulfate that is closely related structurally to heparin 1 -as the common contaminant in the diseasecausing heparin lots. A second study by the same team, in collaboration with investigators from Harvard (Cambridge, MA, USA), Momenta Pharmaceuticals (Cambridge, MA, USA) and Virginia Tech (Blacksburg, VA, USA), demonstrates that this contaminant activates the kallikrein and complement systems in vitro via a surprising pathway involving coagulation factor XII 2 . Both the contaminated batches of heparin and a synthetic version of the oversulfated chondroitin sulfate contaminant cause kallikrien activation and resultant hypotension when administered intravenously to pigs 2 . Together, these elegant studies fulfill Koch's postulates and unequivocally demonstrate that the oversulfated chondroitin sulfate contaminant was the cause of the heparin-induced anaphylaxis in patients. Moreover, they suggest a combination of analytical tests and bioassays that can be used in the future to screen heparin for the contaminant before release to patients.
The response to the heparin crisis was rapid and effective, and all of the involved parties deserve a great deal of credit for working together to effectively protect patients. On the other hand, the crisis has once again raised valid concerns about the safety of our drug supply and the ability of both regulators and manufacturers to ensure drug safety going forward.
Changes in drug manufacture
Ensuring drug safety is the combined responsibility of manufacturers, who are required by law to test their products before releasing them to patients, and regulators, such as FDA, who are mandated with inspecting manufacturing plants around the world to ensure that they comply with good manufacturing practices (GMPs). Several trends illustrate the complex and daunting challenges facing both manufacturers and regulators in ensuring drug safety-challenges that are certain to intensify over the next 5-10 years.
The drug supply chain is globalizing rapidly, making it much more difficult for regulators to monitor all of the manufacturers that play a role in supplying Americans with pharmaceutical and medical products. Until recently, most pharmaceutical manufacturing was carried out in relatively high-cost US and European plants because, unlike lower margin consumer goods firms, the high level of profitability of drugs made most pharmaceutical companies relatively insensitive to the costs of drug manufacturing. Over the past decade, however, pricing pressures combined with accelerated generic incursion have put extreme pressure on pharmaceutical company earnings, leading these firms to focus on reducing their manufacturing costs to maintain profitability. This has increasingly resulted in the outsourcing of pharmaceutical manufacturing to low-cost locations, such as India and China.
As this trend has accelerated, the proportion of active pharmaceutical ingredients supplied by foreign (non-US and non-European) manufacturers has increased dramatically. A recent report from the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) suggests that the fraction of active pharmaceutical ingredients supplied from non-US and non-European manufacturers has increased from only 10% 20 years ago to more than 80% today 3 . This trend will only accelerate over the next decade and will include both small-molecule and biologic drugs.
The FDA is grossly under-resourced both in terms of inspectors and money, making it impossible for the agency to adequately assess and monitor the rapidly increasing number of domestic and foreign manufacturers. According to the GAO, there are currently between 3,000 and 7,000 foreign pharmaceutical manufacturing plants supplying pharmaceutical ingredients for use in the United States 3 . Many of these plants are located in countries with only embryonic pharmaceutical regulatory agencies, increasing the burden on US and European regulators to assure GMP compliance in these foreign facilities. In 2007, the FDA received only $10 million for foreign inspections, much less than the $71 million that the GAO estimates is required for FDA to adequately inspect these foreign plants 3 . According to the GAO, the number of GMP inspectors (for both US and foreign inspections) has declined by approximately 25% from 587 in 2002 to only 446 in 2007 (Fig. 1a) 3 . As a result of this chronic underfunding and the decrease in qualified GMP inspectors, the GAO estimates that FDA is able to inspect only ~8% of the foreign pharma manufacturing plants each year (or each plant once every 13 years) 3 . Moreover, the same report notes that in 2007 the vast majority of these FDA foreign inspections were associated with the approval of a new drug (so called pre-approval inspections) as opposed to focused GMP inspections (Fig.  1b) . Indeed, the report suggested that the FDA carried out only 30 GMP inspections of the 3,000-7,000 foreign plants in 2007 (ref. 3) . In contrast, the FDA carried out an average of more than 1,000 GMP inspections per year of US pharmaceutical manufacturing plants between 2002 and 2007 (Fig. 1b) 3 . Language barriers and the inability of FDA inspectors to conduct unannounced foreign inspections (as they often do in the United States) only increase the difficulty of foreign plant inspections. Parenthetically, the heparin crisis also highlights the risks of allowing pharmaceuticals to be imported in an unregulated fashion from Canada, Mexico and Europe as has been proposed by some in Congress.
Biologics versus small molecules
As underscored by the heparin safety crisis, the introduction of an increasing number of biologic drugs has presented both manufacturers and regulators with significant new quality control challenges ( Table 1) . Traditional small-molecule drugs are typically composed of relatively homogeneous mixtures of synthetic low-molecular-weight molecules that are relatively easy to characterize using well-established analytical techniques such as mass spectrometry. In contrast, both recombinant biologics (typically manufactured in eukaryotic cells or bacteria) and biologics, such as heparin, that are purified from natural raw materials are typically composed of complex mixtures of large glycan and protein molecules containing subtly different polypeptide backbones, distinct folded states and a variety of distinct post-translational modifications, such as glycosylation, sulfation, hydroxylation, carboxylation and lipidation. These mixtures can be accidentally contaminated with both infectious agents, such as viruses, as well as proteins, nucleic acids and lipids. And, unfortunately, as probably occurred in the heparin crisis, such biologic drugs can also be intentionally adulterated with difficult-to-detect biologic impurities.
In certain respects, recombinant proteins are thought to be less prone to variability than proteins purified from natural sources and the risk of contamination from infectious particles or natural products associated with the raw material (e.g., human growth hormone isolated from the pituitaries of Creutzfeld Jakob sufferers) is thought to be smaller. Even so, recombinant biologics are still susceptible to accidental contamination with microorganisms, proteins, nucleic acids and lipids derived from producer cell lines. Ensuring the purity and consistency of such complex biologic drugs requires manufacturers to utilize combinations of sophisticated new analytical tools including chromatography, nuclear magnetic resonance, mass spectrometry and electrophoresis, often in combination with enzymatic digestion and, in some cases, bioassays. Moreover, recent clinical experience with erythropoietin has taught us that even subtle and difficult-to-detect changes in the formulation of otherwise identical recombinant protein pharmaceuticals can lead to increased immunogenicity and autoimmune disease (e.g., pure red cell aplasia in patients receiving Johnson & Johnson's (Bridgewater, NJ, USA) Eprex; epoetin alpha) 4 .
New tools and greater responsibility
Both the FDA and industry lack the sophisticated scientific tools needed to monitor drug safety and manufacturing. A recent report from the FDA Science Board's Subcommittee on Science and Technology (which I coauthored) concluded that owing to rapidly increasing demands and decreasing resources, the FDA cannot fulfill its mission of ensuring drug and food safety because "its scientific base has eroded and its scientific organizational structure is weak" 5 . The committee was particularly concerned that the agency lacked an information technology (IT) infrastructure that would allow it to collect and analyze drug safety information, lacked the resources and the scientific leadership to recruit, train and retain world class pharmaceutical scientists, and received little funding for the development of the next generation of analytical tools to assess drug safety and efficacy. This funding crisis has led to extremely low morale and the loss of many talented FDA employees. We simply cannot continue to ask FDA to do more with less funding.
We also cannot place all of the responsibility for ensuring drug safety on FDA and its congressional funders. As manufacturers increasingly outsource their purchasing of pharmaceutical ingredients to low-cost providers, they must also assume increased responsibility for monitoring the quality of these outsourced ingredients using cuttingedge analytical methods. This will require both an increased emphasis on quality control and increased expenditures for the development of new analytical technologies. Despite the economic pressures currently facing most big pharma companies, the return on these investments, both in terms of ensuring patient safety and preventing reputational and economic damage, should be apparent.
Like the canary that stops singing in the coal mine, the heparin safety crisis is an early and urgent warning of the vulnerability and impending failure of our drug safety system. We must respond to this warning with an extreme sense of urgency if we are to prevent more catastrophic failures of this system as a result of either mistaken or intentional drug adulteration. First, and most importantly, Congress must provide the FDA with the funds it needs to adequately monitor and inspect the thousands of drug manufacturers around the world and to develop cutting edge analytical techniques to assess drug purity. Some of these new funds may come from increased user fees from pharmaceutical companies, but most of the funding must come from federal budget allocations. The 2008 FDA federal budget allocation was $1.72 billion. The Bush administration has recommended a meager 2.9% increase for FY 2009, equivalent to only approximately $51 million 6 . In contrast, the FDA Science Board subcommittee report suggested increasing the FDA budget by at least $300 million/year to make up for years of chronic underfunding 5 .
With these new funds in hand, FDA must work closely with pharmaceutical companies and academic investigators to advance the science of drug testing, particularly for biologic drugs, incorporating the kinds of sophisticated multidimensional analyses employed by Sasisekharan and colleagues 1 in their analysis of the heparin contaminant, and improving their drug tracking and IT systems to prevent contamination and illegal importation of adulterated drugs into the United States. The success of the heparin investigation underscores the powerful results that can be produced by collaborations between FDA, academic scientists and industry. Similarly, the agency needs to work with US and European manufacturers as well as foreign regulatory agencies to provide a coordinated and more frequent schedule of inspections of foreign manufacturing plants using inspectors who speak the local language and are based in these foreign countries. Some in Congress have argued that we cannot afford to increase public spending for these FDA initiatives. The heparin crisis teaches us that if we truly value the public health, we cannot afford not to. 
